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Abstract
In a rm organized into business units, we show when protability increases if
procurement is delegated to the division in charge of production. We highlight that
our results are driven by the business unit having a di¤erent objective function than
Headquarters. The protability of procurement delegation is a¤ected by the essen-
tiality of production facilities to the activities of the rm, and by strategic distortions
in both transfer and input prices. We also look at vertical separation of activities as
an alternative to procurement delegation.
Keywords: strategic delegation, transfer pricing, procurement
JEL classication: D24, D43, M11
1 Introduction
In multinational rms, the mix of centralized and delegated activities varies from one rm
to another, and this is also the case for procurement. Procter and Gamble, for instance,
centralises product development or accounting while business units are responsible for
sales and procurement, whereas in General Electric business units are also in charge of
sales but procurement is centralised.1 In a KPMG survey (2008) 75% of respondents
consider procurement of a high strategic priority, and nearly half of rms in the survey use
some form of decentralized procurement. Most importantly for our purposes, the survey
also highlights that the internal organization of procurement may a¤ect prices charged by
suppliers.
A transfer pricing system for internal transactions lets a multinational company to
transform its divisions into business units or prot centers. Because divisional managers
tend to be evaluated according to how well the division they are in charge of performs, the
introduction of a transfer price system is a powerful incentive mechanism that a¤ects their
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decision making.2 This paper analyses the decision of a rm to delegate or centralize the
procurement of essential inputs to business units in charge of production. We show under
which circumstances delegation of procurement may increase rms clout when bargaining
with suppliers. When there is an increase in bargaining power, it comes from the use of
a delegated agent (namely the manager of the business unit in charge of production) in
bargaining with a di¤erent objective function from Headquarters. Crucially, we show that
the transfer price system can be set in a way that there are no distortions in production
decisions but still lead to discounts in the price of inputs.
We model the following rms problem. In order to produce rms good, the rm
must acquire an input. The input can be obtained from two di¤erent sources: an e¢ cient
supplier or an alternative (for instance, a fringe of standard suppliers or internally). The
implementation of a transfer price scheme allows the rm to decentralize production de-
cisions to business units. Before production starts, the Headquarters chooses who leads
procurement negotiations: it may keep procurement centralized, or it may delegate it to
the factory manager.
Regardless of who negotiates procurement, we show that, when a two part tari¤ is
allowed, the agreement between the rm and the supplier leads to e¢ cient production
levels. To achieve e¢ ciency, the HQ adjusts the transfer price depending on the outcome
of the bargaining stage. Still, announcing the HQ delegates procurement negotiations to
the factory manager has an impact over the rents the supplier can reap in the bargaining
stage. We show that delegating bargaining negotiations to a di¤erent agent from HQ, in
this case the factory manager, allows the rm to shift prots away from the bargaining stage
which in turn lowers the willingness to pay to the e¢ cient supplier. Thus, announcing how
the rm is organized is what provides an strategic edge, serving as a commiment device,
and not the specics of the transfer price. As pointed out by Gimeno (2012) observability
and irreversability of delegation instruments are essential for using delegation strategically.
Several instruments are public, at least partially. One example is compensation schemes
for CEO of public limited companies, but another instance, closer to our model, is the
creation of autonomous divisions such as prot centers.
To check the robustness of our result, we rst study whether other organizational
arrangements rather than delegating procurement to the factory manager may increase
rms bargaining strenght. We show that vertically separating the company allows the
company to divert rents from bargaining through a di¤erent channel, but it is not always
a superior way of organizing procurement activities. By vertically separating the company
the supplier becomes a less determinant player to achieve the rents to be bargained. Sec-
ondly, we also extend our basic result by assuming that the HQ can announce at which
transfer price the rm is internally trading. When procurement is delegated to the factory,
and the HQ can credibly announce a transfer price, the rm nds optimal to distort the
internal price at the cost of producing ine¢ ciently. Setting the internal price articially
low lets the rm shift even more prots from the bargaining stage. However and unlike
2Using transfer pricing is a common practice for multinational rms (see for instance Tang, 2002 where
90% of the surveyed rms use transfer pricing). Moreover, performance evaluation of subsidiaries is one
of the main objectives of decentralizing decisions through transfer pricing (Borkowsky, 1996). Acknowl-
edging that tax purposes is key to understand how transfer pricing is set, according to Ernst and Young
(2003), around 40% of the rms consider that achieving management/operational objectives has a stronger
inuence than tax purposes.
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the existing literature, it is not always in the HQs best interest: the use of this strategic
transfer price does not allow the rm to adapt to the outcome of the negotiation stage.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze some economic forces that may moderate
our main result over delegation. To this end, we consider rst whether the factory is not
essential for the company and can be replaced by an external alternative. In this case, the
rm only centralizes procurement when the external alternative is highly attractive other-
wise the rm prefers delegating procurement to take advantage of an improvement in the
negotiations. Second, we study a situation in which the supplier may behave strategically
and may announce a tari¤ at which the rm and the supplier trade. We show that when
the HQ delegates procurement negotiations to the business unit, both the factory and the
supplier may nd protable to negotiate an input price di¤erent from the e¢ cient one.
This intended high input price fosters the HQ to set a transfer price di¤erent from the
e¢ cient one. Eventually, this increases both suppliers and factorys prot at the cost of
a lower rms prot. As a consequence, HQs tends to centralize both procurement and
production to avoid this undesirable outcome.
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature. First, our paper can be seen
as an illustration of the use of delegated agents in bargaining rstly initiated by Schelling
(1960). Delegating decisions may serve as a commitment device; using a third agent may
allow the player to obtain some strategic advantage, since the agent playing the game can
commit to a certain behavior. However, as noted by Katz (1991), delegation might not
be useful if binding contracts are not observable. Although observability of contracts is
an important feature to make commitments valid, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) nds out
conditions under which the delegation to an agent has still some impact. In particular, they
show that an incentive contract even if the specic details of the contract are unknown may
have a commitment e¤ect.3 More recently and from an experimental perspective, several
authors pointed out that delegating to an agent might help the rm to act tougher when
bargaining (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001 or Hamman et al, 2010).
Second, our paper relates to the literature on transfer pricing iniciated in the seminal
paper of Hirshlei¤er (1956). Our paper is not the rst attempt at analyzing the strategic
impact of using transfer pricing. Since Alles and Datar (1998) a very important strand of
the literature has focused on the strategic use of transfer pricing, i.e., setting the transfer
price away from e¢ cient considerations, in order to gain some competitive advantage (see
Baldenius and Reichelstein, 2006 and Arya and Mittendorf, 2008 and Arya et al. 2008
as a more recent examples focused on buyer-seller relationships).4 However, as fas as we
know, there is no research analyzing the impact of this type of strategic delegation on
procurement activities. An exception and the closer paper to ours is Arya et al (2007).
The authors analyze the interaction between procurement activities and decentralization
of production activities through a TP scheme. The authors obtain that divisionalization of
the rm improve rms prot through a reduction of the suppliers bill. This improvement
is obtained because the rm is able to credibly commit to the use of strategic TP greatly
reducing prots of the division (through a double marginalization e¤ect). The supplier must
then reduce his demands, lowering the price that can be imposed to the division. Although
3More recently, Kockesen and Ok (2004), Gerratana and Kockesen (2012) (2015) further generalyze
these results obtaining that renegotiation of contracts does limit the e¤ect of strategic delegation but it
does not completely break it down.
4See Gox and Schiller (2007) for a survey on the use of transfer prices, and in particular, as an strategic
device and its limitations. See also Gimeno (2012) for a recent review of strategic delegation in general.
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we also focus on how internal organization a¤ect procurement outcomes, initially we do
not allow the rm to use transfer prices statregically and second we allow the rm and the
supplier to use more complex contracts, a two part tari¤ rather than a linear one, when
negotiating for the input. Thus, delegation result is not merely based on the interaction of
the e¢ ciency distortions created by the contract and the transfer price, but a consequence
of how the rm is internally designed.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the main characteristics of the
model. In Section 3, we show when delegation of procurement improves rms bargaining
clout and compare it to other organizational arrangements. We also show in this Section
which conditions are needed for the rm to implement an strategic transfer price. Finally,
in Section 4, we present two di¤erent situations in which the rm may prefer to keep
procurement centralized: when the factory is not an essential input and when the supplier
may behave strategically. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are left in an Appendix.
2 The model
The rm, composed by a factory and a sales division, organizes its production activity as
a business unit.
Costs and revenues. Revenues R(q) satisfy R0 > 0; R"  0. Production costs are given
by C(q), with C 0 > 0; C" > 0. To produce the good the rm must acquire an essential
input on a one-to-one basis for each unit of output produced. There exists two sources for
the input, one more e¢ cient than the other. The e¢ cient one features marginal costs of
production c1 whereas the less e¢ cient procures the input at a higher unit cost c2 > c1.
We will name the e¢ cient source as the e¢ cient supplier or simply the supplier whereas
the ine¢ cient source will be named the alternative.5
We assume that the parties in the negotiation can use a two-part tari¤ T (q) = F +wq
where w is the marginal wholesale price and F is the xed component. Thus prots of
the rm are R(q) C(q)  T (q). The quantity q that maximize rms prots satises the
rst-order condition R0(q)  C 0(q)  w = 0.6 Dene
(w) = max
q
fR(q)  C(q)  wqg (1)
as the level of prots that can be achieved (gross of any fee paid to suppliers). Our
assumptions on revenues and cost guarantees the existence of a unique solution q(w) to
this maximization problem, strictly decreasing in the input cost, q0(w) = 1
R" C" < 0; and
that the prot is decreasing in the input cost, 0(w) =  q(w) < 0.
It is clear that under our technological assumptions optimality involves the use of the
e¢ cient supplier. Assume that the rm and this supplier are indeed one entity; in this
5One interpretation of the source of input c2 is that the rm can alternatively obtain the input from
a less e¢ cient competitive fringe. In this case, payments to the competitive suppliers become T (q) = c2q.
An alternative interpretation is that the rm produces the input internally rather than buying it from
the market. Still another interpretation of this industry structure is that the rm is in negotiations with
a labour union to implement new production methods. The old way of producing the output leads to a
marginal cost c2 whereas the introduction of the new method leads to a new marginal cost c1. The labour
union and the rm bargain over wages, w, and other benets, F (see Zhao, 1998, 2001 and Chongvilaivan
et al, 2013 for a related discussion on internal organization and labor unions)
6FOC are necessary and su¢ cient for a unique global maximum since the problem is strictly concave.
Note that SOC are R00   C 00 < 0 according to our assumptions on R and C.
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case, the rm produces q(c1) which leads to (c1) as the maximum rents that the rm
can achieve. If, instead, the rm produces using the alternative, both the quantity, q(c2),
and the rents generated, (c2), are lower. The di¤erence of prots between choosing the
supplier or the alternative, (c1) (c2), can be shared between the rm and the supplier.
The aim of this paper is to study how the allocation of authority over procurement may
a¤ect whether this increase in rents is achieved, and its e¤ect on the distribution of these
rents.
Timing. The whole interaction between the HQ, the factory and the supplier is as
follows: First, the HQ allocates authority over procurement decisions (to be discussed
below). Then the rm must produce the good, which involves two stages: rst, to negotiate
with the supplier the terms of the contract T (q), and second, after reaching (or not) an
agreement, production of the good.
Note that this timing allows the rm to adjust production decisions to the outcome of
the negotiation stage, that is, to adjust production in accordance to the real marginal cost.
This exibility assumption is crucial to our analysis. If production decisions were taken
before the bargaining stage, and could not be modied afterwards, the supplier would take
advantage of this situation capturing larger rents at the negotiation stage;7 foreseeing what
would happen in the bargaining stage, the rm would presumably reduce its production in
the rst place, leading to lower total prots.
Firm organization over production. The rm organizes its production activity as a
business unit. In charge of the business unit there will be a manager that must maximize
the prots of the factory. The HQ sets a transfer price p and the business unit will have
prots pq   C(q)  T (q). Given a unit price of the input w and a transfer price p, dene
q(p; w) = argmax
q
fpq   C(q)  wqg (2)
as production that maximizes the business units prots,
f (p; w) = max
q
fpq   C(q)  wqg , (3)
as the prots then achieved by the business unit (gross of any fee paid to suppliers) and
nally
(p; w) = R(q(p; w)  C(q(p; w))  wq(p; w) (4)
as those achieved by the whole rm (also gross of any fee paid to suppliers). As we
know since Hirschleifer (1956), prots in (1) can be achieved in a decentralized way if HQ
set a transfer price p(w) = R0(q(w)), since then the factory fully internalizes the impact
of production in rms prots. Thus the business unit produces the optimal quantity,
q(p(w); w) = q(w) and we have (p(w); w) = (w). Dene then
f (w) = f (p(w); w) (5)
as the prots of the business unit when the transfer price is set optimally.
7Assume for instance that the rm commits to q = q (c1) then there are no e¢ cient distortions with the
e¢ cient supplier. It is easy to see that F q = 12 (c2   c1) q (c1) > FC = 12 ((c1) (c2)). By a revealed
preference argument (c2   c1) q (c1) > ((c1) (c2))() (c2) > (c1)  (c2   c1) q (c1)() (c2) >
R(q(c1)) C (q(c1))  c2q (c1) and the last inequality holds since (c2) maximizes prots when the input
cost is c2
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Procurement. The HQ must allocate authority over procurement decisions. Under
Centralized procurement (or C ), it is the HQ who bargains with the supplier, whereas
under Delegated procurement (or D) the business unit manager is in charge of negotiations.
In either case, the rm and the supplier bargain over a two-part tari¤ T (q) = F +wq, and
furthermore we assume all agents involved have equal bargaining power.8
Regardless of rms organization, the supplier has prots s = T (q)   c1q in case
of agreement whereas its outside option is to achieve zero prots. If there is Centralized
procurement, the alternative forHQ is to achieve prots (c2). Hence, if there is agreement
the joint prots of the rm and the supplier increase from JPCoff = (c2) to JP
C = +s =
R(q)  C(q)  c1q.
With Delegated procurement, the alternative for the manager of the business unit is
to achieve f (p; c2). If there is agreement the joint prots of the business unit and the
supplier increase from JPDoff = f (p; c2) to
JPD = f + s = pq   C(q)  c1q: (6)
Given our assumptions of equal bargaining power by those involved in negotiations,
the payment will cover costs of production c1q and assign half of the extra rents JP JP off
to the supplier. The assignment of those rents depends on who is actually bargaining with
the supplier, the HQ and the factory manager, and whether parties involved in bargaining
can alter strategically the transfer price p or the input price w.
3 Organization as an strategic device
In this section we analyze the strategic role of the allocation of procurement decisions. First,
we show that e¢ ciency over production can be achieved by means of e¢ cient bargaining
and then we show that the rm gains clout over the supplier by assigning procurement
decisions to the business unit manager. The details of the Nash bargaining program both
under centralized and delegated procurement are left in Appendix A.
When there is Centralized procurement, it is straightforward to see that q(c1) is the
quantity that maximizes JPC . This can be achieved by setting w = c1 and, at the produc-
tion stage, setting a transfer price p (c1) = R0(q(c1)). Thus, total surplus JPC = (c1) is
achieved and rents are redistributed through a xed payment
FC =
1
2
((c1)  (c2)) : (7)
In the presence of Delegated procurement, to represent the interaction that lead to non-
strategic contracts is more convoluted. HQ cannot commit to a particular transfer price
p, and the factory and the supplier can renegotiate the tari¤ at any moment. We can
represent their interaction as follows: rst, the business unit and the supplier negotiate the
terms of the contract. Then, the business unit communicates to HQ the outcome of the
negotiation stage, that is, whether there is agreement and the details of the contract; but
those details have no strategic e¤ect on the transfer price that HQ sets, since the tari¤
can be modied. In case of disagreement, the HQ sets the optimal transfer price that
8Our results are not sensitive, at least qualitatively, to this assumption as long as parties always retain
some bargaining power. Besides, we do not assume that the factory is more or less able than the manager
when negotiating with the e¢ cient supplier.
6
maximizes prots when marginal cost of the input is c2 , the rm achieves prots (c2)
and the factory have prots f (c2).
When there is agreement between the factory and the supplier, they choose the tari¤
that maximize joint prots in (6) given their expectation about the transfer price p. For
any such expectation on p, in order to produce the quantity that maximizes (6), the tari¤
must feature a marginal payment w equal to the marginal cost of the input, c1. Therefore,
what matters is whether there is agreement or not in the negotiation; HQ knows that
any announced tari¤ featuring w 6= c1 would be renegotiated afterwards. Whenever an
agreement is announced, since the HQ expects w = c1, it sets the optimal transfer price
p(c1) = R
0(q(c1)). The joint prots of the factory and the supplier in (6) when the transfer
price is p(c1) become f (c1) and the fee in the tari¤ will split equally the extra surplus
created through the agreement,
FD =
1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2)): (8)
Thus, no matter who negotiates the contract with the supplier, there is e¢ cient pro-
duction q(c1) when there is a deal with the supplier, and production q(c2) in case of no
deal. Hence, any preference HQ have for one structure or the other must come from a
di¤erent distribution of the surplus between the rm and the supplier; in other words, the
HQ should choose the allocation of authority that minimizes the xed payment to the
supplier.
The following Proposition states the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1 If R" < 0, then payments under Delegated procurement are lower than
under Centralized procurement, FD < FC.
According to Proposition 1, allocating authority over procurement to the factory man-
ager reduces the fee paid to the supplier (FD < FC) without changes in total surplus.
Crucially this reduction of payments is not obtained because the factory makes di¤er-
ent production decisions but because the amount of prots to be bargained are di¤erent
depending on who is negotiating the terms of the agreement. Rewrite rms prot as:
(w) = R (q(w)) R0(q(w))q(w) +R0(q(w))q(w)  C(q (w))  wq (w)| {z }
f (w)
where R0(q(w))q(w) is the transfer payment to the factory. Delegation of procurement is
protable whenever R (q(w)) R0(q(w))q(w) > 0 is increasing in the e¢ ciency of the rm
(R (q(c1)) R0(q(c1))q(c1) > R (q(c2)) R0(q(c2))q(c2) when c1 < c2).9 In words, Delegated
procurement is the best way to organize procurement not because the rents to be obtained
in case of agreement are lower (not because f (c1) < (c1)) but because the increase in
rents for the factory in case of agreement f (c1)   f (c2) is lower than the increase for
the whole rm (c1) (c2). This requires revenues to be strictly concave (R" < 0), since
otherwise both increases f (c1)  f (c2) and (c1)  (c2) become equal.
The strategic e¤ect of delegation is not driven by using strategically transfer prices since
the HQ sets the transfer price that maximizes rms prot, given the marginal cost of pro-
duction. The organization itself serves as a commitment device, or, in other words, the
9We are of course assuming that production optimally adapts to the real marginal cost c1 or c2.
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strategic delegation in procurement activities is e¤ective as long as the organization itself
cannot be easily modied. Thus, our result requires observability of internal organization,
but structural arrangements such prot centers or autonomous divisions are potentially
public unlike internal transfer prices which requires further conditions to assume observ-
ability and irreversibility.
The following gure graphically represents the di¤erence between rms revenues (R (q))
and transfer payment (R0 (q) q) for two frequently used demand functions (linear and CES).
Figure 1 (a) Linear demand function
R(q) =

1  b
2
q

q
Figure 1 (b) CES demand function
R (q) =
1
1   q
1 
A linear demand quadratic cost case can illustrate Proposition 1. With revenues R(q) = 
1  bq
2

q, quadratic cost C(q) = m q
2
2
and input costs T (q) = F +wq, optimal production,
namely, the one solving (1), is q(w) = 1 w
b+m
and gross prots (i.e. not taking into account
the fee) are (w) = (1 w)
2
2(b+m)
. At the production stage, the factory produces q(p; w) = p w
m
.
Optimal production can be decentralized with a transfer price p(w) = R0(q(w)) = m+bw
b+m
and the factory achieves gross prots (again, not taking into account the fee) f (w) =
m
2
 
1 w
b+m
2
.
In this linear example, the way prots are shifted between divisions can be captured
by the parameter  = m
b+m
2 (0; 1), that is, factorys prots are a share of rms prots
f (w) = (w). Interestingly, the input cost plays no role in the way those prots are
split between divisions. What matters exclusively is the relative steepness of rms cost
and revenue function. For instance, if b = m = 1,  = 1
2
meaning that factorys prot
accounts for half of the whole company.10 Delegating procurement becomes less appealing
when the rents the factory manager and the HQ bargain with the supplier are similar,
that is, when revenues are less concave (b low) and/or costs are more convex (high m). To
see this facts in more detail, normalize input costs as 0 = c1  c2 = c  1. When the HQ
10The way prots are shifted from one division to the other is still the same, that is,  = mb+m when the
revenue and cost function are R(q) =

v   bqs1+s

q, and C(q) = m q
1+s
1+s with s > 0.
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centralizes procurement, the fee in (7) becomes
FC =
1
2
((c1)  (c2)) = (2  c)c
4m
(9)
and net prots are
C = (c1)  FC = 1
2
((c1) + (c2)) =
 (2  (2  c) c)
4m
(10)
If the rm decentralizes procurement, the fee in (8) becomes
FD =
f (c1)  f (c2)
2
=
 ((c1)  (c2))
2
=
2(2  c)c
4m
. (11)
and net prots are
D = (c1)  FD = (c1)  1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2)) =  (2   (2  c) c)
4m
(12)
Direct comparison of equations (9) and (11) show that the fee paid to the supplier is
lower under Delegated procurement, FC > FD, whenever  < 1 and similarly comparing
equations (10) and (12) show that prots under Delegated procurement are higher, C >
D, whenever  < 1.
The HQ could introduce a contract that links managers payment to rms perfor-
mance and not only to factorys success. That is, factorys manager incentives could be a
combination of both corporate and divisional performance, that is,
 + (1  )f ;
with weights  chosen by HQ. If  = 1, the manager just tries to maximize rms prots;
when 0   < 1, the objective function of the manager is not perfectly aligned with rms
interests. It is clear that Proposition 1 extends to any  that satises 0   < 1. And,
moreover, the optimal incentive contract, in terms of minimizing payments to the supplier,
is  = 0.
One might consider other organizational arrangements rather than delegated procure-
ment to gain clout over the supplier. For instance, the HQ could vertically split the
company in two di¤erent entities: one owning the retail store being able to obtain revenues
R(q) and the other entity owning the factory with costs C(q). Under Vertical Separation,
or simply V S, the HQ of the former company plays no further role in production and the
manager of the factory becomes HQ of the new company, taking over both procurement
and production decisions. When the HQ chooses to create two companies assume the HQ
cares about total prots of the rm, that is (c1)  T V S(q) where T V S(q) is the payment
to the supplier in the vertical separation case. In other words, assume perfectly capital
markets that allows the HQ from the sale of the factory obtaining a payment that covers
exactly the prots of the separated entity.
We use the Shapley Value as a solution concept of the negotiation with three players
involved in sharing the rents, the sales company, the factory company and the supplier.11
In this simple case, the rents of the grand coalition are (c1). The supplier is not needed to
11Similar results could be obtained if instead of the Shapley value we use simultaneous negotiations
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achieve(c2) but it becomes as essential as the factory and the sales division to generate the
extra rents (c1)  (c2). Therefore, the prots of the supplier will be 13 ((c1)  (c2)).
The allocation of prots can be achieved by a two part tari¤ with an input price equal to
the marginal cost of production c1 and a fee:
F V S =
1
3
((c1)  (c2)) (13)
It is immediate from equations (9) and (13)) that payments under vertical separation
are lower than under centralized procurement, F V S < FC . The intuition for this result
is that under centralized procurement, the rm and the supplier equally share the rents
generated, (c1)  (c2) whereas in the separating case, the supplier needs to agree with
two other companies making the supplier less determinant to achieve the extra rents.
Then, when comparing delegated procurement and vertical separation, we observe that
both organizational structures reduce the xed payment as compared to the centralized
procurement case. Under delegated procurement, some rents are transferred out of the
negotiation through a transfer price scheme, whereas, under separation, some of the rents
are outside the negotiation since the company is split into two di¤erent entities. While
under delegated procurement the share of factorys prots with respect the total companys
prot depends on the optimal transfer price, that is, FD = 1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2)), under
vertical separation, the share retained by the factory remains constant, that is, the supplier
always retains F V S = 1
3
((c1)  (c2)). Therefore, the preference of one structure over
the other depends crucially on the cost/revenue structure.
In the linear demand and quadratic cost case, we can explicitly compare both orga-
nizational arrangements. In particular, from equation (11) and (13) we see that which
organizational arrangement is more protable depends on the convexity of the revenue and
cost functions: payments are lower under delegation, F V S > FD if and only if  2  0; 2
3

(and F V S < FD if and only if  2  2
3
; 1

.
3.1 Transfer Price Commitment
The previous section shows that delegation of procurement when the rm is organized
through business units allows the rm to set aside some rents from negotiation. The result
is obtained even if the choice of internal pricing is nonstrategic. Could the rm improve this
situation by credibly announcing to an observable transfer price? By credibly committing
to an observable transfer price, the rm may deviate from e¢ cient considerations (can set
p 6= R0 (q (c1))) trying to a¤ect suppliers behavior. However, committing to a transfer
processes. Formally the approach used here to share rents is a cooperative game in which we have N = 3
players (the grand coalition) and a characteristic function v : S ! R from the set of all possible coalitions
of players to a set of payments that satises v (?) = 0. The Shapley value gives any player i his (average)
contribution to a coalition, where the contribution is taken over all possible coalitions to which a player i
might belong. More formally, a players is share of the rents are given by
V Si =
X
SNnfig
jSj! jn  jSj   1j!
n!
(v (S [ i)  v (S)) ;
where n is the total number of players and the sum extends over all subsets S belonging to N not containing
player i.
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price also implies the rm cannot adapt its transfer price to the outcome of the negotiation
stage.12
Thus, we can slightly modify the timing on our set-up to account for the possibility that
the HQ sets transfer prices strategically: rst, HQ announces the allocation of authority
over procurement decisions. If the rm centralizes procurement, the game is the same as
previously stated but in case the rm delegates procurement, the HQ publicly announces
one particular transfer price at which divisions trade. Afterwards, the factory manager
bargains with the supplier, and nally produces according to the preciously announced
transfer price and the outcome of the bargaining stage. We use H to denote actions and
payo¤s when the HQ delegates procurement and uses the transfer price strategically.
Under delegated procurement, the level of production is chosen optimally according to
(2), and the bargaining process leads to e¢ cient production, w = c1. The argument is
similar to the one in the nonstrategic situation in Section 2: the supplier prefers to reduce
the marginal wholesale price to increase total rents and grab some of those rents through
the xed component, being FH (p) = 1
2
ff (p; c1)   f (p; c2)g. Thus, when setting the
transfer price, HQ chooses p to maximize,
H (p) = (p; c1)  FH (p) ; (14)
where (p; c1) are the operating prots for a given transfer price p and an input price c1.
The optimal strategic transfer price pH solves the following rst order condition:
[R0(q(p; c1))  p]@q(p; c1)
@p| {z }
Direct effect on operative profits (p;c1)
  1
2
fq(p; c1)  q(p; c2)g| {z }
Strategic effect on the fee FH(p)
= 0. (15)
In words, the rst term in (15) is the direct e¤ect on rents when transfer price is changed,
whereas the second term is the strategic e¤ect of the transfer price on the outcome of the
negotiation. The strategic e¤ect is always negative, higher transfer prices a¤ects negatively
prots through higher fees since prots of the factory increase at a higher rate when the
rm works with the e¢ cient source of the input. The sign of the direct e¤ect depends
on the choice of the strategic transfer price: it is positive if p < R0(q(p; c1)) whereas it is
negative otherwise. Therefore, the following Proposition states whether it is convenient to
distort or not (and how) transfer prices.
Proposition 2 If HQ can commit to a transfer price pH before bargaining takes place, then
the optimal transfer price satises pH < R0(q(c1)) and prots under Delegated procurement
are higher than in Centralized procurement, C < H
 
pH

.
12First, note that in this section we take observability of the transfer price for granted. Existing lit-
erature typically justies observability through two mechanisms: when the rms trades both internally
and externally, the recommendation is to set the internal price very similar to the external one (arms
length principle, OECD, 2011) and the second one is related to tax considerations, and the fact that the
rms may commit to use the same book for both taxes and evaluation purposes (see Baldenius, 2004
and Dur and Gox, 2011, for a discussion on using one or two set of books). Second, we do not allow
the rm to commit to a menu of transfer prices. If the rm were able to do that, the strategic transfer
pricing would always dominate the nonstrategic case (note that you could always replicate the nonstrategic
transfer prices). However, regulatory bodies may be skeptical when facing a menu of transfer prices since
as already stressed by consultants: "alignment of transfer prices with management views of the business
can enhance the defensibility of the transfer prices..."(Ernst and Young, 2003). See Arya and Mittendorf
(2008) for a further discussion on commitment and observability of the transfer price.
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Proposition 2 extends Proposition 1 when transfer prices are strategic; delegating pro-
curement activities to business units provides larger prots than keeping them at the HQ
level. In both strategic and nonstrategic transfer pricing, the relevant feature of delegating
procurement to the business unit manager is that the factory has more clout than HQ
when negotiating the fee with the supplier, because an increase in production costs have
less impact on factory prots than on those of the company as a whole. In the strategic
situation, committing to a transfer price allows the rm to further reduce the relevance
of an agreement in factory prots. Against intuition, however, commitment to a transfer
price does not guarantee the rm larger prots (not even to pay a lower fee to the supplier)
than in the absence of commitment. The reason is that committing to a transfer price, the
rm cannot adapt to the outcome of the negotiation stage.
To see this, note that prots under nonstrategic transfer pricing are those in (12)
whereas equation (14) evaluated at p = R0(q (c1)) leads to
H (p (c1)) = (c1)  1
2
(f (c1)  f (p (c1) ; c2)) (16)
and therefore D > H (p (c1)), that is, prots under strategic transfer price jump down,
not because reduced e¢ ciency in equilibrium but because the alternative becomes less valu-
able when transfer prices cannot adapt to the true marginal cost of the factory (f (c2) >
f (p (c1) ; c2)).13 In Figures 2 (a) and (b), when the rm commits to the e¢ cient transfer
price p = p (c1), prots jump down from D = (c1) FD in (12) to H (p (c1)) as dened
in (16). The rm can improve this situation by distorting the transfer price from p (c1) to
ps, the one solving (2). There are cases in which the jump down in prots is compensated
by distorting the transfer price (case (a)) whereas other cases in which the distortion is
unable to do so (case (b)).
Figure 2 (a) Figure 2 (b)
We rst show a case when the distortion of the transfer price can never compensate
this (discrete) fall in prots. Moreover, we show that not only prots decrease but the
13It should be clear here that if the rm could commit to a menu of transfer prices, there would be
no e¢ ciency distortions in equilibrium, and setting the price in case negotiation fail as high as possible
so prots o¤ equilibrium be the highest possible. In other words you could always replicate the outcome
under nonstrategic transfer pricing, and potentially, the rm would improve that situation.
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lack of adaptability also increases fees to be paid to the supplier. To see these e¤ects, we
analyze the marginal change of fees when the cost of the alternative changes marginally
both under strategic and nonstrategic transfer price. When the price is strategically set
@FH
@c2
= q(pH ; c2) +
 
q(pH ; c1)  q(pH ; c2)
 @pH
@c2
where pH solves (15). First, an increase in the cost of the alternative raises the fee due to
a reduction on rms bargaining (rst element of the rhs of the previous equation). The
rm can reduce the impact of this e¤ect by modifying the transfer price (i.e., by reducing
it, @p
H
@c2
< 0), which in turn reduces the quantity to be produced and eventually the fee.
Note crucially that the positive impact of the strategic transfer prices on the fee depends
on the (di¤erent) quantity produced with the supplier and the alternative.
Instead, when prices are nonstrategic, an increase in the cost of the alternative has a
di¤erent e¤ect on fees:
@FD
@c2
= q(c2)  q(c2)@p(c2)
@c2
where p(c2) = R0(q(c2)) is the nonstrategic transfer price. The rst e¤ect accounts for the
loss in rms bargaining power while the second e¤ect is an adaptive e¤ect: the rmmodies
the transfer price according to the real marginal cost in case negotiations fail reducing the
impact of this increase. The following Lemma compares fees when the alternative is highly
e¢ cient, c2 = c1 + " with " small.
Lemma 1 Fees under strategic transfer prices are larger than under nonstrategic transfer
pricing when the alternative cost is in a neighborhood of c1.
When the alternative is as e¢ cient as the supplier, that is, when c1 = c2, the strategic
and the nonstrategic transfer prices are identical, and the fees paid to the supplier, as
well. However, when the cost of the alternative increases (marginally) nonstrategic transfer
price adapts the price to the real marginal cost under the alternative. The impact on fees
when the rm uses strategic transfer price depends crucially on the quantity produced in
equilibrium and under the alternative. When the alternative is as e¢ cient as the supplier
this e¤ect is negligible and therefore fees are larger than under nonstrategic transfer pricing.
Therefore, since distorting the optimal transfer price leads to lower operating prots
(immediate consequence from Lemma 2) the result in Lemma 1 has immediate consequences
on prots under both strategic and nonstrategic transfer pricing
Proposition 3 Prots under strategic transfer price are lower than under nonstrategic
transfer price when the alternative cost is in a neighborhood of c1.
In words, committing to a transfer price does not allow the rm to adapt the transfer
price to the real marginal cost reducing prots in the alternative (theHQ loses the adaptive
e¤ect). The benet of a transfer price consists in distorting it to reduce the fees and improve
prots. When the alternative is highly e¢ cient, it makes no sense to distort transfer prices
since there are no gains at the fee level and prots are strictly lower than the nonstrategic
case.
When the alternative worsens (when the alternative is not in the neighborhood of c1),
the use of strategic pricing may be benecial since the jump down due to committing to a
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transfer price is lower and second distorting the transfer prices has an impact over fees (since
q(pH ; c1)  q(pH ; c2) > 0). We analyze this possibility by means of the linear demand and
quadratic cost case and we obtain that committing to a price is protable in cases in which
is crucial to gain leverage at the negotiation stage. The use of strategic transfer prices makes
sense when the cost of the alternative is high and/or when rms cost/revenue structure
makes di¢ cult for the rm to reduce factorys prots through nonstrategic transfer prices,
that is, for  large.
We can compare prots and fees both under the strategic and under the nonstrategic
transfer pricing when demand is linear generating revenues R (q) =
 
1  b
2
q

q costs are
quadratic C (q) = m
2
q2 and suppliers cost is normalized to cero, c1 = 0 and rewrite
c2 = c < 1. We know from Section 3 that delegation under nonstrategic transfer prices
leads to fees FD in (11) and prots D in (12). Under strategic transfer prices, the optimal
transfer price is14
pH =
(
(2 c)
2
if c  2
2+
2
2+
otherwise
which leads to fees
FH =
8<:c

(2 c) c
4m

if c  2
2+
2
m(2+)2
otherwise
(17)
and prots
H(pH) =
(
(2 c)2
8m
+ c
2
4m
if c  2
2+

m(2+)
otherwise
(18)
Comparing equations (12) and (18) for prots and equations (11) and (17) for fees lead
to the following Proposition
Proposition 4 In the linear demand and quadratic cost case, fees are lower under strategic
transfer prices, FH < FD, i¤ c  g(), and prots are higher under strategic transfer
prices, H(pH) > D, i¤ c  f(), where
g() =
(
1 
r
(+4)
(2+)2
if 0<< 1
2
2(1 )
1+(1 ) if
1
2
<<1
, f() =

1 
q

2+
if 0<< 2
3
4(1 )
2(1 2)+ if
2
3
<<1
and g() < f().
The solid line in Figure 3 represents the combinations of parameters such that above the
solid line the rm prefers using strategic transfer prices, while the dashed line represents
the combination of parameters such that the fee paid is the same both under strategic and
under nonstrategic transfer price. Therefore three regions are obtained, one in which fees
and prots are larger under nonstrategic (below the dashed function), the second in which
both fees and prots are larger under strategic transfer price (above the solid function)
and nally a third region of parameters in which fees are lower under strategic but the
rm gets larger prots under nonstrategic. In this last region the reduction of fees does
not o¤set the distortions generated at the production level.
14By distorting the transfer price, prots under the alternative may become zero or even negative. We
do not allow for these unreasonable cases and we stick to cases in which rms prot are nonnegative in
all scenarios.
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Figure 3: strategic vs nonstrategic transfer prices. E¤ect on Fees and
Prots
We nish this section by studying the linear revenue case: R (q) = vq being v > 0.
Note that Proposition 1 does not apply for this case, since the result requires revenues
to be strictly concave. It is immediate, though, to see that delegation does not improve
rms prot by any means, that is, D = C . When revenues are linear, and prices are
nonstrategically set, transfer pricing is constant over negotiating scenarios (p = v both
when the factory manager reaches an agreement or not), then the rm is unable to shift
prots outside the factory (R (q)  R0(q)q = 0 at all scenarios). Thus, it is irrelevant who
bargains with the supplier, since the rents at the bargaining stage are always the same.
Therefore, the rm cannot take rents away from the negotiation stage and delegation
procurement has no impact.
This is not the case when the HQ can use transfer prices strategically. First of all,
compared to gures 2a and 2b there is no jump down in prots at p (c1), that is, D =
H (p (c1)). In other words, committing to the e¢ cient transfer price does not worsen
prots under the alternative (f (c2) = f (p (c1) ; c2)), and therefore, the rm can always
replicate the outcome of the nonstrategic situation. But note that Lemma 2 still applies
and therefore HQ should optimally set a transfer price below the e¢ cient, that is, pH < v,
thus shifting prots from the factory to the sales division and taking away some rents from
the bargaining stage. The following Proposition summarizes this nding.
Proposition 5 When revenues are linear, R (q) = vq being v > 0, commitment to a
transfer price leads always to higher prots, that is, H(pH) > D = C
4 Economic forces that go against delegation of pro-
curement
Until now, all the e¤ects we consider favor the decentralization of procurement (maybe
under the form of vertical separation). In this last section we present two e¤ects that may
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moderate this result about the preference for delegation. The rst one analyzes a case
where the factory is not essential for the rm since its activities can be replaced through
an external alternative. The second caveat arises when the rm is facing a supplier that
may behave strategically, that is, a supplier that may announce and commit to a contract,
and therefore may inuence rms behavior.
4.1 Optimal organization when the factory is not essential
In this extension, the rm can shut down the factory and still produce the output externally,
achieving prots ext that are below those that can be achieved with the e¢ cient use of
the factory, ext < (c1).15 We analyze a set-up where bargaining is e¢ cient and as a
consequence in equilibrium the factory is in operation; but we show that the existence of
an alternative may have consequences in the organization of procurement.
If procurement is centralized the alternative for HQ when it bargains with the supplier
is to achieve prots b = maxf(c2);extg in case of disagreement; and the increase in
total prots from an agreement is minf(c1) (c2);(c1) extg. The Nash bargaining
agreement in which the HQ and the supplier share equally the increase in joint prots can
be implemented through a tari¤ that features a marginal price w = c1 and a fee
FC = minf(c1)  (c2)
2
;
(c1)  ext
2
g: (19)
Therefore whenever ext > (c2) the external alternative improves the bargaining position
of HQ under centralized procurement and end up paying a lower fee than the one in (7).
Under delegated procurement, the business unit is in charge of negotiations; but HQ
must approve the agreement and we assume they are still in time to shut down the factory
and produce the output externally. Therefore the fee FD that the business unit and the
supplier agree on must satisfy (c1)   FD  ext for the agreement to be approved by
HQ. The outcome of the negotiation between the business unit and the supplier is a tari¤
that features a marginal price w = c1 and a fee
FD = minff (c1)  f (c2)
2
;(c1)  extg: (20)
When using external production does not bring much benet, ext < (c2), the bargain-
ing clout of HQ does not improve at all and the fee paid when procurement is centralized
is the same as in Section 3, FC = (c1) (c2)
2
. Therefore the result in Proposition 1 directly
applies when ext < (c2): Delegation is then the best way to organize procurement. An
attractive external production ext > (c2) will tend to be more useful under centralized
procurement, however, since in delegated procurement it only works as an upper limit in the
fee that the supplier can charge. As a consequence, the manager of the factory sometimes
plays a softer hand than HQ in negotiations. Indeed, whenever the restriction on the fee is
binding, f (c1) f (c2)
2
> (c1) ext and thus FD = (c1) ext, centralized procurement
would allow the rm to pay a lower fee FC = (c1) 
ext
2
< FD = (c1) ext. For interme-
diate values of the external alternative, i.e. when (c2) < ext < (c1)  f (c1) f (c2)2 , the
possibility of external production increase the bargaining clout of HQ whereas it doesnt
15We consider this alternative to be exogenous and hence we do not model how the rm achieves that
level of prots.
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a¤ect the fee that a business unit is charged. If we express the prots under external
production as ext = (c1); where  2 (0; 1) measures its value, then we can write the
fee FC under centralized procurement as
FC =
 1
2
((c1)  (c2)) if  2
 
0; C

1
2
(1  )(c1) if  2 (C ; 1)
where C = (c2)
(c1)
; and the fee FD under delegated procurement as
FD =
 1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2)) if  2
 
0; D

(1  )(c1) if  2 (D; 1)
where D = 1  f (c1) f (c2)
2(c1)
. It is immediate to see that a strictly concave revenue function
(R00 < 0) implies C < D. We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 The fee paid in centralized procurement is below the one paid in delegated
procurement, FC < FD, whenever  2 (; 1), where  = 1  f (c1) f (c2)
(c1)
2  C ; D.
According to this Proposition, we obtain that centralized procurement is the optimal
organization when the external alternative is su¢ ciently attractive,  2 (; 1). Delegated
procurement is still chosen for values of the alternative  2  C ;  for which the external
alternative improves the bargaining clout of HQ in centralized bargaining; only when this
external alternative is su¢ ciently attractive (and therefore HQ can ask for a low fee) is
centralized procurement chosen. Figure 4 illustrates this result by plotting fees obtained
under centralized procurement (solid line) and fees obtained under delegated procurement
(dashed line) as a function of the external alternative, measured by .
Figure 4. Fees under centralized and delegated procurement when the
factory is not essential for the activities of the rm.
17
As an example of this Proposition, consider the linear demand and quadratic cost
function case. The prots of a business unit can be written as f (w) = (w), where
 = m
b+m
2 (0; 1). And prots when the factory is used with the ine¢ cient technology are
(c2) = (c1), where  = (1 c21 c1 )
2 2 (0; 1) measures the di¤erences in e¢ ciency of the
available suppliers.
We can write the fee under centralized procurement as
FC =
 1
2
(1  )(c1) if  2 (0; )
1
2
(1  )(c1) if  2 (; 1)
and the fee under delegated procurement as
FD =
(
1
2
(1  )(c1) if  2
 
0; 2 
2
+ 
2


(1  )(c1) if  2
 
2 
2
+ 
2
; 1

For any given values of parameters ;  2 (0; 1) we see that fees are lower under cen-
tralized procurement, FC < FD, when the external alternative is good enough, that is,
whenever
   = + (1  ) (1  );
and keeps delegating procurement otherwise. Thus, there are values of the external pro-
duction  2 (; ) such that HQ improve their bargaining position against the e¢ cient
suppliers but still prefer to delegate procurement.
4.2 Strategic supplier
The rm is facing a supplier that may behave strategically, that is, a supplier that may
announce and commit to a contract, and potentially inuencing rms behavior. A rationale
for this case may arise if the supplier is selling the product externally to the rm and
internally to other suppliers divisions through the use of transfer pricing (see Arya et al,
2008).
The timing is similar to the benchmark case with the exception that the tari¤may play
an strategic role. The HQ states who negotiates with the supplier, then either the HQ
or the factory bargains with the supplier and announces a particular tari¤ T (q) that will
not be renegotiated afterwards, and nally the rm starts production needs. During this
section we will use the term S when the HQ delegates procurement and the supplier may
behave strategically.
Under centralized procurement, the supplier improves nothing by announcing a di¤erent
tari¤ from TC (q) = FC + c1q (c1). An input price di¤erent from the marginal cost of
production, that is setting w 6= c1, reduces the quantity to be produced and therefore the
rents to bargain with. However, under delegated procurement, this is not necessarily the
case: by credibly committing to T (q) 6= TD (q) = FD+ c1q (c1), the supplier may inuence
the transfer price by setting an input price w 6= c1.
Under delegated procurement, the production stage leads to optimal decisions. Given
the transfer price p and the input price w the factory chooses q(p(w); w) according to (2)
and the HQ can achieve, given w, the optimal production by setting p(w) = R0(q(p(w); w))
(optimality is still conditional on the right expectations over w). At the bargaining stage
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and in case negotiations fail, the input price rises up to c2 and the factory obtains f (c2).
When the factory and the supplier bargain, they choose the tari¤ T (q) = F + wq that
maximize joint prots in (6). Since this is simply a two-part tari¤ any agreement between
the supplier and the factory manager should feature the restriction that the marginal
wholesale price cannot be set above c2. Because otherwise, if the input price is set above
c2, then the factory manager could always trade with the alternative paying a lower per
unit price.16
When this constraint is not binding (w < c2), the optimal input price wS solves the
following rst-order condition,
(w   c1)@q(p(w); w)
@w
+
@p
@w
q(p(w); w) = 0: (21)
The rst element, the direct e¤ect, is the e¤ect of the input price on the quantity produced
by the factory while the second element, the strategic e¤ect, is the e¤ect that the input
price has on the internal price set by the HQ. The sign of the direct e¤ect depends on
the choice of the input price: it is negative if w > c1 and positive otherwise. Instead, the
strategic e¤ect is always positive, since the HQ should optimally increase the transfer price
to respond to higher marginal costs (in this case, the input cost).
The following Lemma species the tari¤, production decisions and rms prots under
S. It is instructive to dene the following threshold  (c1)  c1 R"(q(wS))q(wS)  0 where
wS solves (21),17 since the exact shape of the contract depends on the relative e¢ ciency
of the supplier and the alternative. We say that the alternative is e¢ cient when when
c2 2 (c1;  (c1)) and ine¢ cient otherwise.
Lemma 2 Under S, the optimal contract displays the following characteristics:
(a) When c2 2 (c1;  (c1)), the contract is F S =  12 (c2   c1) q(c2) and wS = c2, production
q = q(c2), and rms prots are S = (c2) + 12 (c2   c1) q(c2)
(b) When c2 >  (c1), the contract is F S = 12

f (w
S)  f (c2)
   1
2
(wS   c1)q(wS) and
wS 2 (c1; c2), production q = q(wS) < q(c1), and rms prots are S = (wS)  F S
First of all, the tari¤ between the factory and the supplier always leads to ine¢ cient
production, w > c1. When the strategic e¤ect was absent setting w = c1 was indeed
optimal. Now, in this framework, when w = c1, the rst order condition in (21) is still
positive, @p
@c1
q(p(c1); c1) > 0. Thus, both the supplier and the factory benet by distorting
input prices so as to inuence transfer prices even though this comes at the cost of producing
ine¢ ciently. By increasing the input price, the transfer price is set according to the real
marginal cost, and joint prots increase. The supplier reaps some of those extra prots
through the bargaining process.
The exact value of the distortion depends on the relative e¢ ciency of the alternative
and the supplier. When the alternative is e¢ cient (case (a) in Lemma 2) the input price
16In other words, the contract between the factory manager and the supplier is a non-exclusive dealing.
We could assume the HQ delegates to the factory manager the decision to sign an exclusive dealing with
the supplier, that is, a two-part tari¤ including an exclusivity clause; a clause forcing the rm to buy
the input at the supplier. Including this clause into contracts implies that agreements featuring an input
w > c2 may be perfectly the solution of factory and managers joint prots. By the end of this section we
briey discuss the consequences of allowing the factory manager to sign exclusive contracts. We do so by
assuming two cases: one in which exclusive dealing is subject to the approval of the HQ and a second one
in which the decision to sign exclusive dealing is completely delegated.
17For instance, for a linear demand case in which R(q) = (1  b2q)q and C(q) = m2 q2 (c1) = (1 )+c12 
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is set at its maximum level, w = c2, and the rm thus produces at its lowest level of
production, q(c2). Instead, when the alternative is more ine¢ cient (case (b) in Lemma 2),
the input price is set at an intermediate unit price, w 2 (c1; c2), but still the production is
ine¢ ciently low.
It is worth mentioning that the x component FD may take negative values; it is the
supplier who pays the rm (the factory, indeed) for accepting the terms of the contract.
The intuition of this negative x component may be seen in the following way. When the
alternative is ine¢ cient, both the factory and the manager agrees on setting the largest
marginal wholesale price possible, w = c2. Net of xed payments, the factory gets exactly
f (c2) (the same amount obtained under the alternative). Since the rents generated under
this agreement rises up to (c2   c1) q(c2), the factory reaps half of those rents; rents that
can only be satised through the x component.18
We now focus on suppliers prots when the supplier can commit to the contract stated
in Lemma 2, and we relate suppliers prots to the ones obtained under D and under
C. Let us dene by the subscript isup the prots of the supplier for a specic way of
organizing procurement activities i 2 fC; S;Dg. It is immediate to see from Proposition 1
that Csup = F
C > Dsup = F
D. The following result allows us to state that suppliers prot
under S remain between prots of D and S.
Lemma 3 When the supplier behaves strategically, if R00 < 0 then Ssup 2
 
Dsup;
C
sup

First, as compared to the delegated procurement case, the supplier gets larger prots by
setting a distorted input price wS > c1. Note that, unlike the HQ behaving strategically,
the supplier can always replicate the e¢ cient contract, setting w = c1 and grabbing rents
through the fee FD. By distorting the input price, the supplier can manage to e¤ectively
inuence the transfer pricing, increasing joint prots and eventually grabbing some of
those extra prots. Second, as compared to the centralized procurement case, the supplier
achieves lower prots than the centralized situation: the loss of e¢ ciency caused by the
distortion of the input price, wS > c1; is always larger than the increase in suppliers prots
due to the commitment e¤ect.
Given this potential unwanted production levels, the HQ may prefer to centralize pro-
curement activities. Centralizing it raises production up to its e¢ cient level, q(c1), and
hence prots (net of xed payment) increases, as well. However, centralizing does re-
duce rms bargaining strength increasing the x component and reducing rms prots
(see Proposition 1). The next proposition shows a case where the rm always centralizes
procurement.
Proposition 7 When rms alternative is e¢ cient that is, when c2 2 (c1;  (c1)), HQ
centralizes procurement.
This result states that, anticipating suppliers strategic behavior, the rm should cen-
tralize procurement if there are no substantial di¤erences between the two sources of the
input. The distortions generated by delegating activities, i.e., producing q(c2) instead of
q(c1), cannot be compensated by the positive fee paid by the supplier. This cuto¤  (c1)
18This could be seen potentially as an slot allowance or even as a bribe from the supplier to the factory
manager. In this model, we assume that the negative x component is returned to the rm and not kept
privately in hands of the factorys manager (see Troya-Martinez and Wren-Lewis, 2016 for a model in
which corrupt intermediaries may exist).
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should be seen as lower bound since, as long as w = c2 > c1, prots under centralized are
strictly larger than delegated procurement when the supplier behaves strategically.
When the alternative is ine¢ cient (the optimal solution of the contract is an interior so-
lution) distortions are not so pronounced and the rm may prefer to delegate procurement.
The di¤erence of prots between centralized and delegated procurement can be rearranged
in the following way:
C   D =

1
2
(c1)  (wS) + 1
2
f (w
S)  1
2
(wS   c1)q(wS)

+
1
2
((c2)  f (c2)) :
First, centralizing procurement provides more prots than delegating it because prots
obtained under the alternative are always larger, 1
2
((c2)  f (c2)) > 0 but this e¤ect is
reduced the lower the e¢ ciency of the alternative, that is,
@((c2) f (c2))
@c2
 0. In the limiting
case when there is no alternative, i.e., the best case scenario for delegated procurement,
the rm may still centralize procurement. To be this true, the rst element of the former
equation should be positive, that is, delegation never takes place if, after rearranging,
(c1) 
 
(wS) + (wS   c1)q(wS)
  (wS)  f (wS);
the gains of producing e¢ ciently are larger than the gains of paying less at the bargaining
stage.
The sign of this inequality is not conclusive for general functions but we can compare
di¤erent organizational structures when the demand is linear generating revenues R(q) = 
1  b q
2

q and cost are quadratic C(q) = m q
2
2
. We know from Section 3 that centralized
procurement leads to w = c1 and a fee FC in (9) and prots C in (10). Under S, the
optimal contract leads to a two part tari¤ with the following fee F S and unit price wS:
F S =
8<:  
(c2 c1)(1 c2)
2m
if c2 2 (c1;  (c1))
(3 2)(1 c1)2
4m(2 )2  
2(1 c2)2
4m
if c2 2 ( (c1) ; 1)
and wS =
(
c2 if c2 2 c2 2 (c1;  (c1))
(1 )+c1
2  if c2 2 ( (c1) ; 1)
Then the suppliers prots are
S =
8<:
(1 c1)(1 c2)
2m
if c2 2 c2 2 (c1;  (c1))
(4 3)(1 c1)2
4m(2 )2 +
2(1 c2)2
4m
if c2 2 ( (c1) ; 1)
(22)
where the exact shape of the contract depends on the constraint w  c2 being binding
or not (see Lemma (2)) where the cuto¤  (c1) =
(1 )+c1
2  2 (c1; 1) when the demand is
linear and costs are quadratic. Comparing equations (22) and (10) for prots leads to the
following result.
Proposition 8 HQ centralizes procurement if c2 2 (c1;  (c1)), where  (c1) = 2 (+
p
)+
p
c1
2  ,
and delegates otherwise.
The former Proposition shows a case where, in some cases, it is more convenient to
centralize whereas in others delegating procurement is the optimal way to organize pro-
curement activities. When the alternative is e¢ cient, centralize procurement emerges as
the optimal organization; the argument is similar to Proposition 7, e¢ ciency distortions
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are larger than potential gains at the bargaining stage. Moreover, it is easy to see that
 (c1) >  (c1): HQ centralizes procurement beyond stated in proposition 7, conrming the
idea that the cuto¤ (c1) is a lower bound on centralizing procurement activities. When
the e¢ ciency of the alternative worsens, the rm is in a weaker position and being tougher
at the bargaining stage becomes more relevant than e¢ ciency considerations.
A nal comment concerns the assumption on the characteristics of the contract signed
between the supplier and the factory manager. We have imposed a restriction on the input
price w; a restriction well justied if the contract is a non-exclusive deal. Assume though
that the factory manager and the supplier may sign a two part tari¤ including an exclusive
clause and assume the HQ delegates such decision to the factory manager. The basic
di¤erence between these two cases arises when the restriction w  c2 under non-exclusive
deals is active. Under exclusive deals, the optimal tari¤ avoid the restriction w  c2; the
tari¤ is simply the solution to (21), implying an input price featuring wS > c2 if c2 2
(c1;  (c1)). It is immediate to see that the unconstrained joint prot maximization leads to
higher prots to both the supplier and the factory, but since w > c2 > c1 then overall prots
generated by this agreement are even lower, S
 
wS

+ Ssup
 
wS

< S (c2) + 
S
sup (c2).
Given these two observations, rms prots under non-exclusive are always larger than
under exclusive deals (or the same level of prots when the restriction is not active).
Anticipating this, the HQ centralizes procurement if wS > c2. by a similar argument
provided in Proposition 7.
Another possibility would be to allow the factory manager to sign contracts subject to
HQs approval. In this case the factory manager and the supplier maximize joint prots
subject to the constraint that the agreement must be at least as good as the alternative,
that is, S
 
wS
   F  S (c2). Even if we add this restriction, the agreement obtained
can never provide larger prots than under non-exclusive deals. When it is optimal to
set wS > c2 either the HQ would block the agreement and the supplier and the factory
manager set precisely wS = c2 or it does not block the agreement and the rm sets a larger
input price. In either case, prots the HQ anticipates this ine¢ cient behavior and prefers
to centralize procurement.
Finally, given that Ssup 2
 
Dsup;
C
sup

as stated in Lemma 3 and the fact that the
rm may recover procurement decisions (as discussed in Propositions 7 and 8), the sup-
plier always improves prots as compared to the delegated situation (Section 3). This
improvement comes from two di¤erent channels: (a) if the HQ delegates procurement the
supplier distorts the input price, setting wS > c1, thus increasing prots. The second
mechanism arises when the HQ, anticipating a high distortion of input prices, may take
control over procurement decisions leading to an improvement of suppliers prot (since
Csup = F
C > Dsup = F
D).
Proposition 9 Committing to a contract always improves suppliers prot. When the
alternative is e¢ cient, announcing a distorting contract deters delegation of procurement.
The next gure graphically represents the former result. We graphically represent sup-
pliers prots as a function of the alternative e¢ ciency c2. First, the dotted line represents
suppliers prots under D, the benchmark case; the dashed line represents suppliers prots
under C, that is, when the supplier bargains with the HQ and nally the light dashed line
represents suppliers prots under S, that is, prots obtained if the contract signed was
the one dened in Lemma 2. The solid line represents suppliers prots when HQs deci-
sions to either centralize or delegate procurement are taking into account. When strategic
22
considerations were absent, it was optimal to delegate decisions to the factory manager
(Proposition 1), leading to low suppliers prots (the dotted line). When the supplier be-
haves strategically, it may happen that theHQ is forced to take over procurement decisions
leading to an increase of suppliers prots (from dotted to dashed) or it allows the factory
to bargain even if it leads to ine¢ cient production choices. Still, the supplier improves
prots by distorting input prices since it is able to inuence transfer price (from dotted to
light dashed line)
Figure 5. Suppliers prots linear demand, quadratic cost example  = 1
2
5 Concluding remarks
The main goal of this paper is to understand the benets of delegating procurement to
a business unit in charge of production. We show conditions under which the delegation
of this activity improves rms bargaining against suppliers. The benets arises as long,
by delegating, factorys prots are lower than rms prots which improves rms bargain-
ing positioning. We show, unlike Arya (2007), the existence of those benets both under
strategic and non-strategic transfer prices. Further, we show that the use of strategic
transfer prices does not necessarily improve rms prots and they may be counterpro-
ductive. Alternative organizational arrangements such as vertical separation may be an
alternative but not superior way to organize procurement activities. We extend the initial
framework by introducing other aspects that may moderate the decision to decentralize
rms procurement. First, the rm owns an external alternative that allows to shut down
the factory. Second, the factory and the supplier privately negotiate the input price. In
both cases, we obtain situations in which still the rm prefers rmsprocurement to be in
factorys hands.
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The model presented in this paper aims to characterize an industry structure in which
the rm needs to acquire an input from an external source to produce a good, and then
the sales division markets the good. This industry structure naturally captures situations
in which a divisionalized rm needs to interact with key suppliers or engages negotiations
with union labours at the factory level. As a consequence, the agent in charge of leading
procurement negotiations must be the one with the adequate expertise, that is, the agent
in charge of production decisions or the HQ. Our result on delegation is not necessarily
restricted to this particular industry structure and can be extended to other industries in
which production decisions fall on the agent in charge of marketing the product and where
our results remain essentially unchanged. A potential example of this industry structure
can be captured by the broadband industry. In this industry, the rm owns a technology
able to send content at a high speed but it also need to distribute content in order to
satisfy its nal consumer. In this case, the sales division, having a superior knowledge of
consumers preferences, should be the one leading procurement negotiations with content
producers, deciding which set of products are of interest.
Finally, there are at least two natural extensions. First, the multiplant case: note that
in this case, the rm can use the organizational structure to increase rms bargaining
positioning, but it can also shift production to increase its positioning. When the rm
owns several factories, it may not always be optimal to keep decentralization at the factory
level, and the rm partly centralize rms procurement by building a new layer, namely,
a central purchasing. Second, the introduction of uncertainty at the demands side. In
that framework, the sales manager knows the true realization of the demand but cannot
communicate it to theHQ or to the factory (followingWeitzman, 1974). Thus, the problem
faced by the HQ is to whom provide authority over quantity; to the sales division and taking
advantage of the local information knowledge or to the factory and reinforce the bargaining
position against the supplier.
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6 Appendix A
Below we show the outcomes of bargaining when procurement is centralized and when it
is delegated
6.1 Bargaining under centralised procurement
The optimal contract between the supplier and the headquarter is the solution to the fol-
lowing problem
max
fF;wg
[(w)  F   (c2)]
1
2 [F + (w   c1)q(w)]
1
2
Let us rst take logs to convert the program into
max
fF;wg
1
2
ln [(w)  F   (c2)] + 1
2
ln [F + (w   c1)q(w)]
and the rst order conditions are
@
@F
= 0()  
1
2
(w)  F   (c2) +
1
2
F + (w   c1)q(w) = 0
@
@w
= 0()
1
2
@(w)
@w
(w)  F   (c2) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

F + (w   c1)q(w) = 0
Note rst that from @
@F
= 0 we obtain the xed component FC
FC =
1
2
[(w)  (c2)]  1
2
(w   c1)q(w)
By plugging FC(w) into @
@w
= 0, we obtain
1
2
@(w)
@w
1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) = 0()
@f (w)
@w
+ (w   c1)@q(w)
@w
+ q(w) = 0
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Note that by applying the envelope theorem @f (w)
@w
=  q(w) which means that
@
@w
= 0() (w   c1)@q(w)
@w
= 0
which holds if and only if w = c1 since
@q(w)
@w
= 1
R00 C00 < 0. Thus, w = c1 and F
C =
1
2
[(c1)  (c2)]
6.2 Bargaining under delegated procurement
The optimal contract between the supplier and the factory is the solution to the following
problem
max
fF;wg

f (w)  F   f (c2)
 1
2 [F + (w   c1)q(w)]
1
2
Let us rst take logs to convert the program into
max
fF;wg
1
2
ln [f (w)  F   f (c2)] + 1
2
ln [F + (w   c1)q(w)]
and the rst order conditions derived from the lagrangian are
@L
@F
= 0()  
1
2
f (w)  F   f (c2) +
1
2
F + (w   c1)q(w) = 0
() 1
2
[F + (w   c1)q(w)] = 1
2
[f (w)  F   f (c2)]
@L
@w
= 0()
1
2
@f (w)
@w
f (w)  F   f (c2) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

F + (w   c1)q(w) = 0
Note rst that from @L
@F
= 0 we obtain
FD(w) =
1
2
[f (w)  f (c2)]  1
2
(w   c1)q(w)
By plugging FD(w) into @
@w
= 0, we obtain
1
2
@f (w)
@w
1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) = 0()
@f (w)
@w
+ (w   c1)@q(w)
@w
+ qf (w) = 0()
(w   c1)@qf (w)
@w
= 0
where the last equivalence is obtained by noting that @f (w)
@w
=  q(w). Finally, since
@q(w)
@w
< 0, w = c1. Finally, plug w = c1 to obtain the payment FD = 12 [f (c1)  f (c2)].
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7 Appendix B. Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. We want to show that if R00 < 0, then FD < FC . First, we
know that production levels are always q(c1) if negotiations succeed and q(c2) otherwise.
Second, according to the expressions of the fees FC in (7) and FD in (8) FD < FC ()
1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2)) < 12 ((c1)  (c2)) () R0(q(c1))q(c1)   R0(q(c2))q(c2) < R(q(c1))  
R(q(c2)) and rearranging
FD < FC () R (q(c2)) R0(q(c2))q(c2) < R(q(c1)) R0(q(c1))q(c1):
where R(q(ci))   R0(q(ci))q(ci) > 0 i = 1; 2, since R00 < 0. Let us dene the function
f(q) = R (q)   R0(q)q. This function is increasing in q since df(q)
dq
=  R00(q)q > 0 and
f(0) = 0. To prove the result it is left to remind that q(c1) > q(c2), since
@q
@w
= 1
R00 C00 < 0.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst see that at the transfer price that maximizes total
surplus, p(c1) = R0(q(c1)), prots under Delegated procurement are larger: In equilibrium
total surplus is (c1), the supplier charges a fee FH (p(c1)) = 12ff (c1) f (p(c1); c2)g and
the rm have prots (c1) FH (p(c1)). Thus these prots are higher than under Central-
ized procurement if the fee FH (p(c1)) is lower than the fee under Centralized procurement
FC = 1
2
((c1)  (c2)). Indeed, FH (p(c1)) = 12
R c2
c1
q(p(c1); w)dw < F
C = 1
2
R c2
c1
q(w)dw
since q(p(c1); w) < q(w) if w > c1. But HQ can obtain even higher prots setting a
lower transfer price, since at p = R0(q(p; c1)), the rst order condition in (15) becomes
 1
2
fq(p; c1)  q(p; c2)g < 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiating fees under strategic transfer price w.r.t c2 leads to
@FH
@c2
= q(pH ; c2) +
 
q(pH ; c1)  q(pH ; c2)
 @pH
@c2
where pH solves (15).
Di¤erentiating fees under strategic transfer price w.r.t c2 leads to:
@FD
@c2
= q(c2)  q(c2)@p(c2)
@c2
p(c2) = R
0(q(c2)) is the nonstrategic transfer price. Now, note that when c2 = c1 pH =
R0(q(c1)), which implies that q(pH ; c2) = q(c1) = q(c2) and therefore FD = FH . Note that
@FH
@c2
= q(pH ; c2) >
@FD
@c2
= q(c2)   q(c2)@pNS(c2)@c2 > 0 () R00 < 0 and the stated result is
obtained. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, rms prots when the transfer price is not strategic areD = (c1) 12 (f (c1)  f (c2))
and di¤erentiating (and applying envelope theorem) with respect to c2, we get
@D
@c2
=
1
2

 q(c2) +R00(q(c2))q(c2)@q(c2)
@c2

rearranging and noting that @q(c2)
@c2
= 1
R00 C00 < 0, we obtain
@D
@c2
=
1
2
C 00(q(c2))
R00(q(c2))  C 00(q(c2))q(c2) < 0
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Second, rms prots when the transfer price is strategic areH = (pH ; c1) 12
 
f (pH ; c1)  f (pH ; c2)

where pH solves (15), and di¤erentiating (and applying envelope theorem) with respect to
c2, we get
@Str
@c2
=  1
2
q(pH ; c2) < 0
Now, note that when c2 = c1 pH = R0(q(c1)), which implies that q(pH ; c2) = q(c1) = q(c2)
and therefore D = (c1) = H . Note that @
D
@c2

c2=c1
= 1
2
C00(q(c1))
R00(q(c1)) C00(q(c1))q(c1) while
@H
@c2
=  1
2
q(c1). Since
C00(q(c1))
R00(q(c1)) C00(q(c1)) < 1 () R00 < 0 the stated result is obtained.
QED
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we nd fees and prots when the transfer price is
strategic, and then we compare prots under strategic and under nonstrategic. First,
under strategic transfer price, it is still true that e¢ cient production can be achieved by
means of a two part tari¤, that is, the optimal quantity of the factory is q(p; 0) = p
m
under the supplier and q(p; c) = p c
m
under the alternative, which in turn implies prots
f (0) =
p2
2m
and f (c) =
(p c)2
2m
, and therefore
FH (p) =
1
2
(f (p; 0)  f (p; c)) = 1
4m
 
p2   (p  c)2
Since prices are strategic, prots under the alternative might be negative. We do not allow
for that and assume that if the optimal strategic transfer price is p  c then f (c) = 0.
Thus, FH (p) 2
n
1
4m
c(2p  c); p2
4m
o
where the second case arises whenever p  c. Thus,
the optimal strategic price is the solution to
max
fpg
R(q(p; 0)) C(q(p; 0) FH (p) =

1  bq(p; 0)
2

q(p; 0) mq(p; 0)
2
2
 FH (p) =

1  p
2
 p
m
 FH (p)
When prots under the alternative are positive, then the FOC is 1
m
  p
m
  c
2m
= 0, that
is, pH = (2 c)
2
. Therefore the fee and prots are to be paid is
FH
 
pH

= c

(2  c)  c
4m

; H =
(2  c)2
8m
+
c2
4m
When prots under the alternative are negative, then FH (p) = p
2
4m
and the FOC is 
1  p


p  p
2
= 0 which leads to pH = 2
2+
. Therefore, fee and prots are
FH
 
pH

=
2
m(2 + )2
; H =

m(2 + )
Finally it is left to see that whenever pH = (2 c)
2
 c () c  2
2+
prots under the
alternative become negative. Thus, the solution to this problem leads to the following fees
and prots:
FH
 
pH

=
8<:c

(2 c) c
4m

if c  2
2+
2
m(2+)2
otherwise
; H =
(
(2 c)2
8m
+ c
2
4m
if c  2
2+

m(2+)
otherwise
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Finally, the optimal piecewise nonstrategic price is
pH =
(
(2 c)
2
if c  2
2+
2
2+
otherwise
It is left to compare fees and prots both under D and under H. We rst compare prots,
that is, D and H (a piecewise function). Note that D = 

2 (2 c)c
4m

from equation
(12). We rst compare D and H when prots under the alternative are positive. Thus
H = (2 c)
2
8m
+ c
2
4m
, and
D  H () 

2  (2  c)c
4m

 (2  c)
2
8m
+
c2
4m
which is true when c  4(1 )
2(1 2)+ . Note that
4(1 )
2(1 2)+  22+ ()   23 . Second, we
compare D and H when prots under the alternative are cero. Thus, H = 
m(2+)
, and
D  H ()

2   2(2  c)c
4m

 
m(2 + )
which is true when c  1  
q

2+
and 1  
q

2+
 2
2+
()   2
3
. Thus, the following
threshold function for prots
f() =
8<:1 
q

2+
if 0 <  < 2
3
4(1 )
2(1 2)+ if
2
3
<  < 1
states that strategic transfer prices provide larger prots if c  f() (and nonstrategic
transfer prices leads to larger prots otherwise).
We do a similar exercise for fees, comparing FD with FH (a piecewise function). Note
that FD = 
2(2 c)c
4m
from equation (11). We rst compare FD and FH when prots under
the alternative are positive. In this case, FH = c

(2 c) c
4m

, and
FD  FH () 
2(2  c)c
4m
 c

(2  c)  c
4m

which is true when c < 2(1 )
 2+1 . Note that
2(1 )
 2+1  22+ ()   12 :Otherwise, compare
FD and FH when prots under the alternative are cero. Thus, FH = 
2
m(2+)2
, and
FD  FH () 
2(2  c)c
4m
 
2
m(2 + )2
which is true when c < 1 
q
(+4)
(2+)2
and 1 
q
(+4)
(2+)2
> 2
2+
()  < 1
2
.Thus, the following
threshold function for fees
g() =
8<:1 
q
(+4)
(2+)2
if 0 <  < 1
2
2(1 )
1+(1 ) if
1
2
<  < 1
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states that strategic transfer prices leads to lower payments if c  g() (and nonstrategic
transfer prices leads to lower payments otherwise).
Finally, it is left to show that f()  g(). First, it is almost straightforward to see
that f()  g() when  > 2
3
and when  < 1
2
When  2  1
2
; 2
3

we need to show that
1  
q

2+
> 2(1 )
1+(1 ) . On the one hand, f () = 1  
q

2+
is a strictly decreasing convex
function. Since  2  1
2
; 2
3

this function takes minimum value when  = 2
3
and f(2
3
) = 1
2
.
On the other hand, g () is a strictly concave function with a local maximum in  = 1
2
and g(0) = g (1) = 0 and g
 
1
2

= 2
5
. Therefore since f
 
2
3

> g
 
1
2

, this implies that
f()  g() holds in this interval. QED
Proof of Proposition 5. First, we show that (a) D = C when revenues are linear
and then we show that (b) H > D. To prove (a), under nonstrategic transfer pricing
quantities are e¢ cient both under delegated and under centralized procurement and we
want to prove that
D = C () FD = FC () 1
2
((c1)  (c2)) = 1
2
(f (c1)  f (c2))
The e¢ cient transfer price is p = R0 (q (w)) = v when revenues are linear. Note that
(w) = f (w) () R (q(w))   (C(q (w) + wq (w)) = R0(q(w))q(w)   (C(q (w) + wq (w))
which is true if revenues are linear. Thus, D = C : To prove (b), if the rm sets p = v,
then H (p) = D, which is true as long as f (c2) = f (p; c2). The last comparison holds
because p = v maximizes prots under the alternative. Finally, it is left to see that by
Lemma 2, @
H(p)
@p

p=v
< 0. Hence, H > D. QED
Proof of Lemma 2. The optimal contract between the supplier and the factory is the
solution to the following problem
max
fF;wg
[f (w)  F   f (c2)]
1
2 [F + (w   c1)q(w)]
1
2 s:t w  c2
Let us rst take logs to convert the program into
max
fF;wg
1
2
ln [f (w)  F   f (c2)] + 1
2
ln [F + (w   c1)q(w)] s:t w  c2
and the rst order conditions derived from the Lagrangian are
@
@F
= 0()  
1
2
f (w)  F   f (c2) +
1
2
F + (w   c1)q(w) = 0
() 1
2
[F + (w   c1)q(w)] = 1
2
[f (w)  F   f (c2)]
@
@w
= 0()
1
2
@f (w)
@w
f (w)  F   f (c2) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

F + (w   c1)q(w)    = 0
where   0 is the lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint w  c2. Note rst that
from @
@F
= 0 we obtain the xed component F S
F S(w) =
1
2
[f (w)  f (c2)]  1
2
(w   c1)q(w)
31
First, take the case  = 0, which implies that w < c2. By plugging F S(w) into @@w = 0, we
obtain
1
2
@f (w)
@w
1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) +
1
2

(w   c1)@q(w)@w + q(w)

1
2
(f (w)  f (c2)  (w   c1)q(w)) = 0()
@f (w)
@w
+ (w   c1)@q(w)
@w
+ q(w) = 0()
@p(w)
@w
q(w) + (w   c1)@q
f (w)
@w
= 0
because @(w)
@w
= @p(w)
@w
  q(w) + (p(w)   w   C 0(q(w))@q(w)
@w
= @p(w)
@w
  q(w). Knowing that
@p(w)
@w
= R00 (q(w)) @q(w)
@w
< 0 the rst order condition can be rewritten as
@p(w)
@w
q(w) + (w   c1)@q(w)
@w
= 0()
@q(w)
@w
(R00 (q(w)) q(w) + (w   c1)) = 0
and @q(w)
@w
< 0 implies wS = c1   R00 (q(w (c1))) q(w (c1)) =  (c1) > c1. Note that this
implies that w = c1 cannot be a local optimum and therefore w 2 (c1;c2). Now, take the
case  > 0, which implies that w = c2 and F S(w) becomes F S(c2) =  12(c2  c1)q(c2) < 0.
Finally, the restriction is active when c2 2 (c1;  (c1)) and inactive otherwise. QED
Proof of Lemma 3. We want to show that Csup > 
S
sup > 
D
sup. First, 
S
sup > 
D
sup
it is a direct implication of (21): it is optimal to distort the contract, and set wS > c1
(although the supplier can always set w = c1), thus, joint prots, and as a consequence
suppliers prots, are not maximized at c1. Second, we show that Csup > 
S
sup. We
show this in two parts depending on whether the constraint w  c2 is binding or not.
First, note that Csup = F
C = 1
2
((c1)  (c2)). If c2 2 (c1;  (c1)), the supplier obtains
Ssup =
1
2
(c2   c1) q(c2) under delegation. Note that
Csup > 
S
sup () (c1) > (c2) + (c2   c1) q(c2)
() (c1) > R(q(c2))  c1q(c2)  C(q(c2))
which is true since q(c2) is not the optimal production for w = c1. If c2 >  (c1) ; the supplier
obtains Ssup =
 
wS   c1

q
 
wS

+F S under delegation, where F S = 1
2

f (w
S)  f (c2)
 
1
2
(wS   c1)q(wS) and wS 2 (c1; c2). Thus, we want to prove that
Ssup =
1
2
 
f (w
S) + (wS   c1)q(wS)  f (c2)

< Csup = F
C =
1
2
((c1)  (c2)) :
First, Ssup < 
C
sup if
f (w
S) + (wS   c1)q(wS)  f (c2) < (c1)  (c2).
Second, under wS the whole rm achieves prots (wS),which is larger than the prots of
the factory f (wS) since (wS)   f (wS) = R(q(wS))   R0(q(wS))q(wS) > 0 if R" < 0.
Besides, if wS < c2, we know that f (wS)   f (c2) < (wS)   (c2). Therefore, adding
(wS   c1)q(wS) to both sides of the former inequality
f (w
S) + (wS   c1)q(wS)  f (c2) < (wS) + (wS   c1)q(wS)  (c2):
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Finally, note that (wS)+ (wS  c1)q(wS) < (c1) since q
 
wS

is not the optimal produc-
tion for w = c1. Therefore, f (wS) + (wS   c1)q(wS)   f (c2) < (c1)   (c2) implying
that Ssup < 
C
sup. QED
Proof of Proposition 7. Under centralized procurement, there are no distortions on
wholesale prices, and the rm achieves prots C = (c1) TC = (c1)  12 [(c1) (c2)],
whereas under delegated procurement prots are S = (c2) + 12(c2   c1)q(c2). Then
C > D () (c1)  1
2
[(c1)  (c2)] > (c2) + 1
2
(c2   c1)q(c2)()
(c1) > (c2) + (c2   c1)q(c2) = R(q(c2))  C(q(c2))  c1q(c2);
which is always true since q(c2) is not the optimal quantity at marginal costs of the input
c1. QED
Proof of Proposition 8. We need to compare C with S. On the one hand,
C = 1
2
( (c1)  (c2)), and when the demand is linear and costs are quadratic, we have
previously derived optimal quantity, q (w) = (1 w)
m
, and operating prots, (w) = (1 w)
2
2m
.
Thus,
C =
1
2
( (c1)  (c2)) = 
4m
 
(1  c1)2 + (1  c2)2

:
On the other hand, S is dened in (22). Now, let us make the following change of variable
that simplies calculus: d1 = (1  c1)2 > 0 and d2 = (1  c2)2 > 0.
(a) If c2 2 (c1;  (c1)) then C > S ()
 (d1 + d2)
4m
>
p
d1
p
d2
4m
() d1 + d2  
p
d1
p
d2 > 0
()
p
d1    
p
d2
2
+
p
d1
p
d2 > 0
() (c2   c1)2 +
p
(1  c1)
p
(1  c2) > 0;
therefore, C  D () c2 2 (c1;  (c1)).
(b) If c2 2 ( (c1) ; 1), then S > C ()
 (4  3) d1
4m (2  )2 +
2d2
4m
>
 (d1 + d2)
4m
() d1  (2  )
2

d2:
Reordering this inequality for c1 and c2 we obtain thatC  D () c2 2

(1 )+c1
2  ; 1  (1  c1)
p

2 

which can be rewritten as C  D () c2 2

(1 )+c1
2  ;
2 (+
p
)+c1
p

2 

. Finally, (a) and
(b) together imply that C  D () c2 2 (c1;  ()) where  () = 2 (+
p
)+c1
p

2  . QED
Proof of Proposition 9. Direct observation from Lemma 3 and Propositions 7 and
8. First, Lemma 3 allows us to rank suppliers prots, Ssup 2
 
Dsup;
C
sup

, that is, the
e¢ cient supplier prefers procurement to be centralized rather than delegated, and in the
case it is delegated, it obtains higher prots by distorting input prices. Second, the HQ
anticipating suppliers behavior may decide to centralize procurement or to delegate it to
the factory manager; when the alternative is e¢ cient the HQ always centralizes procure-
ment (Proposition 7) and when the alternative is very ine¢ cient the rm may prefer to
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delegate procurement and allow for distorted input prices (as in the example summarized
in Proposition 8). In either case, suppliers improves prots if we compare it to the del-
egation without distortions of the input price. The second part exists whenever the HQ
decides to centralize procurement, which happens when the alternative is e¢ cient. QED
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